Perfectly acceptable words can become detestable through
overuse and misuse. “Incredibly” and
“iconic” vie for first place on my list of abhorrent words. Overuse sucks the lifeblood out of them. Why can’t somebody just be who she is, for
example, without the adverb “incredibly” dressing up and confusing a pejorative
or praising adjective? An incredibly talented oboe player may not be all that talented if her talent
is not credible.
What also drives me nuts are guests on radio and television
interviews who respond to the host’s salutation, “Thanks for being here,” with
the cloying response, “Thanks for having me.” On the occasions when an interviewer with poor
judgment has actually… (Whoops! Another word I despise.)
“Actually”… really? “Actually” is a revolting redundancy. Where
were we? Oh, yes, “when an interviewer with poor judgment has…” thanked
me for an interview, I respond with the novel, “You’re welcome.” And,
besides, I would never thank anyone for being had.
And we need not dwell on the insufferable “no problem.” “Can you change a dollar for me?” How about this for a unique answer from the
cashier ‑ “yes”? Even if I asked would
it be a problem to change a dollar, a good response would be “no” if the
cashier can and will change a dollar. The
cashier does not have to add “problem” to “no.” I wonder how the cashier would
respond if I asked, “Would it trouble you to change a dollar?” I can
barely tolerate “no trouble,” but would go crazy if he said “no problem.”
Recently I was introduced to a new word I am certain will
not be overused. It was discussed in an article sent to me by well-known trial
attorney John Blumberg. The article
appears in the November 2017 issue of Los Angeles Lawyer. It was written by prominent appellate
attorney Marc Poster. For those of you
who have not heard of these attorneys, I suppose they are neither well known
nor prominent from your limited perspective. To maintain balance and fairness in my column,
from time to time I have mentioned attorneys who are neither well known nor
prominent. But to avoid controversy, and
possibly a spurious lawsuit from unknown attorneys, please strike the
adjectives “well known” and “prominent” from the descriptions of the two
lawyers mentioned above.
Where were we? Oh,
yes, the new word Poster writes about. The
word is “dubitante.” Like most of you, I
didn’t know what it meant either. Poster
tells us dubitante comes from the Latin word “doubting” and is used in judicial
decisions. In my 42 years of judging, I
never came upon dubitante, and I admit it scares the hell out of me. I confess to being in a perpetual state of
doubt. I have argued that uncertainty
pervades the law, but dubitante, if carried to extremes, and we see extremes
raging across the world these days, could undermine the entire judicial
system. Poster says, “A judge voting
dubitante signifies that he or she doubts the decision rendered, but is
unwilling to state it is wrong.” It
might also be called an “indecision.”
Dubitante has its place when a judge deciding a case doubts
the validity of her decision because it must be based on precedent established
by a higher court. But what about Judge
Dillard in Nalley v. Langdale (2012) 734 S.E.2d 908, 922,
quoted by Poster. Dillard acknowledges
in his concurring opinion that if he were deciding the case alone, his
“reasoning and conclusions” could differ from the majority opinion. Huh? But, not to worry, the concurring Dillard
assures us that his “colleagues have carefully and seriously studied the
case.” He defers “to the conclusions
they have reached,” but then he pulls the carpet from under us with the caveat
that his deference is emasculated by his “considerable reservations” about the
majority’s conclusions.
Wait a second. Last
time I checked, we judges are obligated to decide. It is in the job description. Judge Dillard’s frank admission is
disquieting. Is it possible that on
occasion a concurring judge who has vague doubts about concurring in an opinion
goes along because of time constraints or laziness? This could all be happening just below the
level of consciousness. This approach to
jurisprudence reminds me of a New Yorker cartoon from many years ago. The jury foreman is standing and addressing
the judge. The caption reads: “Your Honor, we would rather not get
involved.”
Dubitante can usher in a new judicial philosophy, the
school of Doubtful Jurisprudence where opinions are doubtful or simply not
rendered because the result is doubtful.
The dubitante judicial philosophy could well be influenced by the
parting comments of Judge Posner on his retirement.
Posner posits that judges mostly do whatever they want and
dress up the result in legal language. In an interview with Adam Liptak in the New
York Times, Sept. 11, 2017, Posner said, “I pay very little attention to legal
rules, statutes, constitutional provisions. A case is just a dispute. The first thing you do is ask yourself‑forget
about the law‑what is a sensible resolution of this dispute?” Posner believes that if there is a “Supreme
Court precedent or some other legal obstacle [standing] in the way of ruling in
favor of that reasonable resolution,” a rare occurrence, “they’re often easy to
get around.”
Dubitante is less or more honest, depending on your point
of view. It acknowledges that the judge
does not know or is not sure what the answer is. Posner’s parting philosophy could convince
the judge who is unsure of the result to craft an opinion she or he thinks is
sensible.
A judge who I
never thought would have anything in common with Judge Posner was my friend,
Harry Pregerson, who passed away last month.
Posner was an exponent of the economics school of jurisprudence. He was a conservative for whom principles of
social justice were overshadowed by principles of economics and social
utility. But he changed and became more
like Judge Pregerson for whom the plight of the poor and disadvantaged was of
prime importance. Pregerson was
unabashed in expressing his judicial philosophy for which he, like Judge Posner
of late, took criticism. It was reported
that in his senate confirmation hearings he told the senators, “If I had to
follow my conscience or the law, I would follow my conscience.”
When I first
went into private practice in the Valley, Harry’s office was a block or two
away from my office. We would exchange
greetings in court and share a few war stories.
When Harry became a municipal court judge, I appeared before him on a
dog bite case. I will save that
hilarious story for another column. I appeared
before him when he was a superior court judge as well. I can assure you that, even though I
prevailed in both cases, it had nothing to do with our friendship.
Harry was sui
generis, a gentleman, filled with love and respect for everyone. He made a difference. And here there is no dubitante.