"There is more than one way to skin a cat." How I despise that detestable aphorism. There are more genteel ways to express that
there is more than one way to accomplish a task. Is the adage even apt? It is hard for me to imagine one, let alone
two or more ways to accomplish this abhorrent act. Nevertheless, I draw upon this pitiless yet
familiar proverb because everyone knows in an instant what it means. It is my opening to discuss the au courant practice
of avoiding traditional avenues to seek justice. Some call it alternative dispute
resolution. It is one thing in the area
of civil law, but something quite different in criminal law.
I am not
talking about creative or new methods of dispensing justice in the traditional
forums. A goal of the Realignment Act is
to reduce the prison population. (See
Pen. Code, §§ 17.5,
subd. (a)(4) & (5), 1170,
subds. (h).) Some judges employed novel
sentencing techniques to accomplish this goal long before the Realignment Act
became law. Shaming defendants because
of their wrongdoing is an example.
In the old days people could endure
just about anything but shame. If you
felt ashamed, it would be unbearable to look others in the eye. That’s why Oedipus switched to Braille. His “shameful” act has become a popular
expression of derision, more frequently used by those who have never heard of
Sophocles. Like substantial evidence
questions, the expression occurs with “rhythmic regularity” in the transcripts
of criminal cases.
Does anyone feel humiliation or shame
nowadays? If “reality” shows are an
indication, the answer is obvious.
People eat live bugs and snails, reveal their most vulgar traits, plot
against their friends, have sex with strangers, and suffer innumerable
humiliations witnessed by millions of enthusiastic viewers. If Hester Prynne were here, she would be
doing commercials for the Auto Club.
In United
States v. Gementera 379 F.3d 596 (2004), defendant was convicted of
stealing mail. As part of his punishment,
he was ordered to stand in front of a post office for a day wearing a sandwich
board sign that said, "I stole mail.
This is my punishment." On
appeal, Gementera argued that the sentence was not legitimate because it violated
contemporary standards of decency and humiliated him. The Ninth Circuit saw it differently and
affirmed the sentence. The majority
acknowledged that the sign condition likely will cause Gementera humiliation or
shame, but the condition is reasonably related to rehabilitation, a goal of the
federal Sentencing Reform Act. Apparently
it did not occur to Gementera that his pilfering letters violated contemporary
standards of decency.
In Demery v. Arpaio 378 F.3d
1020 (2004), the sheriff used "web‑cams" to stream on the Internet
live images of pretrial detainees in county jail. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of a preliminary injunction prohibiting this practice. The appellate court failed to see how turning
pretrial detainees into unwilling objects of a kind of reality show served any
legitimate goal. The practice amounted
to unlawful punishment of pretrial detainees.
There were dissents in both Gementera and Demery proving
that notions of justice can depend on perception and the right panel.
If shame is an anachronism, why did
Gementera and Arpaio appeal? I think
there is a world of difference between choosing to act in humiliating and
shameful ways in front of a jaded public, and quite another to be forced to do
it.
One California judge, since retired,
ordered a beer thief to wear for one year a T-shirt on which was boldly
written, "I am on felony probation," and "My record plus two six
packs equals four years." The Court
of Appeal in People v. Hackler 13 Cal.App.4th 1049 (1993) disallowed the
order reasoning that the T-shirt just might not favorably impress prospective
employers, thus defeating defendant's rehabilitation. In another case, unpublished, the same judge
sentenced a woman convicted of beating her children to wear a contraceptive
Norplant device as a condition of probation.
The judge’s rationale for the sentence was that the defendant was a drug
addict and the dependency court had terminated her parental rights to her five
children. The judge reasoned that he was
trying to protect a child not yet conceived from brutality and neglect. No surprise that on appeal this sentence was
reversed as unconstitutional.
Many years ago
Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Veronica Simmons McBeth made international
headlines when she sentenced a slum landlord who refused to bring his apartment
house up to code to live in the squalor of his own dilapidated tenement for a
few months.
In
appropriate criminal cases, creative sentencing that avoids incarceration is
beneficial to society and to defendants.
But it is quite another story when alternative dispute resolution is
used to avoid prosecution in criminal cases.
We reject the
notion that gangs may exact retribution against one another for perceived
criminal acts. We should also reject the
notion that those who belong to religious,
social or ethnic groups that break the law may bypass society's law
enforcement system for their own internal system of justice. It has been reported that some in the
hierarchy of the Catholic Church thought it best that priests accused of
molestation be dealt with within the church rather than through the police
department, the district attorney and the criminal courts.
In an
article in The New Yorker (Nov. 2014)
entitled "The Outcast," Rachel Aviv wrote a compelling piece about a
man's teenage son who was allegedly molested by a man who prayed at the
synagogue to which they belonged. Aviv
wrote about the Hasidic community of Borough Park, Brooklyn where these alleged
acts occurred. A "modesty
committee" enforces standards of sexual propriety among Borough Park's
hundred thousand ultra-Orthodox Jews according to Talmudic law. Aviv reports that "[w]hen children
complain about being molested, the council almost never notifies the police.
Instead, it devises its own punishments for offenders: sometimes they are
compelled to apologize, pay restitution, or move to Israel." The article raises questions that apply to
all groups whether they be religious or not.
Is it ever appropriate to keep matters involving the criminal "in
house"?
Less
serious alleged criminal violations may not always be amenable to adjudication
in traditional courts. Penal Code section 383b states in
part: "Every person who with intent
to defraud, sells or exposes for sale any meat or meat preparations, and
falsely represents the same to be kosher, … is guilty of a
misdemeanor…." Many decades ago,
when I was a young deputy city attorney for the City of Los Angeles, I was
assigned a case in which a violation of section 383b was alleged. I leave for another column my adventure with
the kosher chicken case.
The
California Supreme Court in Erlich v.
Municipal Court of Beverly Hills Judicial Dist. 55 Cal.2d 553 (1961) held
that the statute was constitutional and not void for uncertainty. But Korn
v. Rabbinical Council of California, a civil case originally cited as 148 Cal.App.3d
491 (1983), held that the determination of whether a meat company's food is
kosher is an ecclesiastical question best left to an ecclesiastical court when
rabbinic authority is in disagreement over whether the meat is kosher. This holding could have a profound effect on
criminal cases or maybe not. The
California Supreme Court ordered that the "opinion be not officially
published."
Except
in the most exceptional criminal case, I draw upon what is reputed to be an old
Spanish proverb: "There are more ways of drawing a cat out of a
well than by the bucket." I
prefer my own version: "There is no
better way of drawing a cat out of a well than by a bucket."